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Ihe stakes are high for the music industry in light
of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing, technology which allows
computer users to search the contents of other comput-
ers for MP3 and other media files to download. In an age
of expanding digital technology, the growth of the Internet,
and the expansion of fair use, copyright holders are being
deprived of their economic incentive to create works. In
fact, nowhere is digital technology more destructive of
copyright than in the pirating of music.' As a result of
online copyright infringement, record labels have success-
fully shut down (at least for the time being) file sharing ser-
vices such as Napster 2 and my.MP3.com 3
However, unlike Napster, P2P-applications, such as
FastTrack, have the promise to expand information flow
in unprecedented and legitimate ways.' P2P technology
allows individuals to share graphics, video clips, documenta-
tion and online support. A peer-to-peer capability would
give individuals a private, locally controllable method of
sharing information, with unlimited storage space.' Not
surprisingly, the music industries have worked hard to
stamp out P2P programs in courts. However, there are
more advantageous routes to take in discouraging copy-
right infringement.
This paper seeks a resolution between the need to
eliminate copyright infringement and the desire to encour-
age new technology. This paper will suggest that the music
industry would be better off directing resources toward
solutions such as compulsory licensing, royalty collection,
and working with hardware manufacturers to discourage
copyright infringement. These solutions would allow the
industry to take advantage of file sharing now rather than
expending resources in court where the desired result of
ending P2P programs may never come.6
As copyrighted works have moved increasingly
toward interactive digital distribution, the record industry
and artists are looking for an increasingly reduced role for
fair use. One of the major difficulties in creating a viable
digital lending scheme is to determine a legal justification
for it. For the most part, the fair use doctrine cannot justify
lending of digital works under its current legislative formu-
lation.
7
Fair use is extremely limited and, in some cases, dif-
ficult to apply. The statutory definition includes four fac-
tors to help courts determine fair use cases: (I) the pur-
pose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; (4) and the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work. 8
Courts have continued to apply the fair use doc-
trine despite its limitations, and despite its inapplicability to
technological innovation. In 1984, Universal, which owned
several copyrighted television programs, sued Sony, maker
of the Betamax video tape recorder, for copyright infringe-
ment because consumers could use the Betamax to repro-
duce Universal's programs. 9 The Supreme Court ruled in
favor of Sony, finding that the Betamax could be used for
infringing uses, but was allowable because it also was capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses, such as time-shifting--
watching a show at a later time. 0
The Sony decision significantly expanded the scope
of fair use. " In finding that private reproduction for pur-
poses such as time-shifting, and creating a personal archive
would not harm the potential market for the copyrighted
program, the majority rather carelessly strained the defini-
tion of contributory infringement to allow devices that are
"merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses,' without
carefully considering the infringing uses. 2 And since the
Betamax was capable of such noninfringing uses, Sony could
not be held liable for contributory infringement of Univer-
sal's copyrights. 3
Following a traditional copyright analysis, the dis-
sent was considerably more carefully reasoned than the
majority opinion. The dissent vigorously argued that pri-
vate reproduction--home-recording--was not authorized
by the fair use doctrine whatsoever "Neither the [Copy-
right Act] nor its legislative history suggests any intent to
create a general exemption for a single copy made for per-
sonal or private use" " But the result of Sony was that
certain reproductions of copyrighted works for personal
use were recognized as fair use, thus
expanding the doctrine. In of the Sony
decision, the Court emphasized the dif-
ference between commercial and non-
commercial copying. " This sent a mes-
sage that fair use allowed any kind of
copying so long as the consumer did
not sell the copy.
Since the Sony decision, con-
sumers consider fair use a free-for-all,
whereby interested consumers can
make as many copies of a copyrighted
work as they want, without 
infringing
on a copyright. 16 However, the com-
plete copying of a copyrighted work is not a fair use. If the
court actually applied the fair use factors, it would not have
found a fair use. In Sony, the Court should not have found
a fair use because the fair use factors as written did not
fit within the context of the Betamax. Because Sony had
expanded the fair use doctrine in this way it would not be
long before fair use would apply to peer-to-peer file sharing
programs and other digital copying programs.
In granting and affirming the grant of a preliminary
injunction against Napster's file-sharing service, both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit walked through the
four outdated fair use factors. The private sharing of files
through Napster was nontransformative and commercial; it
involved entertaining works "closer to the core of intended
copyright protection;" and the entire work was copied.
If the Court in Sony had adequately reasoned the
fair use factors it would have been similar to the decision
in Napster in that the fair use doctrine did not apply. More-
over, with the rise of Napster and CD burners-- and the
implementation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA)--it became even more obvious that the fair use
legislation was already out of date. 17 It was out of date
when Sony was decided.
Now, there is a legal movement afoot to squash
peer-to-peer file sharing. The music industry has filed suit
against the peer-to-peer file sharing program, Kazaa. Of
course, Kazaa defends itself using the same fair use argu-
ments enunciated in Sony and Napster. However, what
makes this lawsuit so unseemly is that the Kazaa peer-
to-peer file sharing program has "substantial noninfringing
uses" and is gaining legitimacy, unlike Napster, which makes
it that much harder for the industry to label Kazaa as a
rogue copyright infringer. Under the guise of fair use, the
court will likely find in favor of Kazaa.
The industry's lawsuit against Kazaa is seeking to
eliminate a new kind of information dissemination; how-
ever, the jurisprudence in this area does not side with
copyright owners when the music industry tries to pre-
vent these new means from gaining widespread public use.
When courts do not deem the dissemination harmful to
copyright owners, courts decline to find infringement, even
though the legal and economic analyses that support those
determinations often favor the copyright holder. 8 On the
other hand, when copyright owners seek to participate in
and be paid for the new modes of exploitation, the courts
and Congress appear more favorable to the proposition. In
addition, copyright owners believe they should get some-
thing for the new exploitation, and when the new market
not merely supplements but also rivals prior markets, copy-
right owners can control that new market. This control
permits copyright owners to refuse to license, and there-
fore to charge market prices.
In this vein, Kazaa has been thriving in the open
market by making deals with legitimate technology vendors
since its inception. For instance, Kazaa inked a deal with
a European ISP recently, despite the music industry's law-
suits against foreign Internet service providers, which allow
access toWeb sites that have pirated music. '9 More impor-
tantly, Microsoft is distributing some videos on Kazaa soft-
ware using its new version of Media Player. 20 Videos are
put on the Kazaa network by a company that uses Micro-
soft's digital-rights-management software to place elec-
tronic locks on the songs and videos its distributes. Those
locks, in turn, deter unauthorized copying, enabling compa-
nies to take advantage of the virtually free distribution pro-
vided by Kazaa without losing the ability to demand pay-
ment and limit usage. 2' Since others in the technology
field are utilizing the software, the music industry should
become involved in the distribution of the software while
the technology is new, so copyright owners can have a say
in how it is implemented and who can use it. More impor-
tantly, copyright owners should recognize these technolo-
gies so they can negotiate royalties sooner rather than later
22
However, courts cannot provide adequate legal res-
olutions with the outmoded fair use doctrine, especially in
the P2P context. Of course, courts will use the fair use
doctrine, but ultimately decisions will be based more on
preserving technology and encouraging interested parties
to work out an arrangement with P2P software develop-
ers. Because of the judiciary's inability to fashion a more
predictable regime for finding copyright infringement, Con-
gress must take the necessary legislative changes to balance
the protection of copyright and the needs of consumers
and the public interest in the digital environment. 23 Unfor-
tunately, the current legislative proposals are not finding the
balance that is needed in this area.
The music industry's strategy of targeting P2P soft-
ware will ultimately become ineffective as a copyright pro-
tection strategy. It is anathema to the evolution of new
technology to encourage excessive controls of technology
in the name of copyright protection. Even though the music
industry has the Napster ruling on its side, and for good
reason, peer-to-peer networks are increasingly being used
by corporations and the government to disseminate per-
fectly innocent, noncopyrighted data. As those "substantial
noninfringing uses" grow, the case for shutting down peer-
to-peer programs becomes weaker.24
In the future there will no longer be individuals to
target. In fact, P2P file sharing programs will become
more ubiquitous, and the music industry will not have the
means to eliminate infringers individually. Unlike Napster,
peer-to-peer programs will no longer
be maintained by a central server, thus
making it harder for the music industry
to target entities or individuals in law-
suits.
The music industry must use
its resources more efficiently because
control will not be easy to exercise
within the P2P context. This inability to
control Internet pirates makes a com-
pulsory license regime more attractive.
Compulsory licensing is a regime that
gives the new technology access to the copyrighted mate-
rial, but it makes sure that the new regime pays for the
access. Historically, where a new technology emerges that
changes the interaction between protection and access,




One of the first examples of such a compulsory
licensing regime is that of the player piano. 26 Before the
player piano, copyright owners of music made their money
by selling sheet music. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
it was not a copyright violation to add sheet music to
a piano roll and then sell the piano roll, which made it
no longer necessary to buy the sheet music. 27 After the
Court's ruling, Congress changed the law giving the sheet
music manufacturer the right to make copies after an initial
mechanical production has been made and pay a fixed rate
for those copies. That was a way to make sure copyright
owners got paid. Similarly, Congress created a compulsory
licensing regime with respect to broadcasting content after
cable television set up technologies to steal the content
of broadcasters and then sell it to their customers after
the Supreme Court ruled that it was not a violation of
copyright law.21 Consequently, establishing such a com-
pulsory licensing regime for P2P software manufacturers
would ensure that not one industry has control over the
technology, so it can thrive or wilt in the Internet market.29
Perhaps one solution would be a publicly-funded,
collectively-administered, blanket licensing scheme for the
noncommercial, private use of digital works.3" In American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., ", the Court recom-
mended a licensing scheme that was privately funded and
administered by a copyright collective in much the same
way as the Copyright Clearance Center works. The Audio
Home Recording Act (AHRA) of 1992 provided for a levy
on equipment to fund what was, in effect, a collectively-
administered blanket license for private, digital audio tape
copying.
12
The AHRA was a compromise among copyright
owners and hardware manufacturers that the distribution
of digital audio recording devices be permitted, subject to a
statutory royalty on the equipment so long as the devices
allowed the recording only of a first generation copy. 11
Diverting costs to the manufacturers who have precipi-
tated the increase in unauthorized reproduction and use of
copyrighted works would supply the money for the collec-
tive fund.
The principal argument for the creation of a Digital
Lending Right (DLR) is that if payment is made to copyright
holders, then use of their works is removed from the realm
of unauthorized use and piracy. This frees the music indus-
try to concentrate on collecting money instead of spending
it targeting individual users. A DLR policy would reduce
the problems of policing and enforcement and reduce the
costs of litigating on a case-by-case basis. The blanket
license that would allow for the free lending of digital works
would pre-empt future litigation. In sum, DLR would make
it much simpler for both industry and consumers than the
current model of enforcement and fair use.
This proposal has problems, too. Distribution of
the collected sums and copyright owners may pose hur-
dles to successful implementation of this solution. 3 4 While
direct downloads can be tracked, file sharing might not be
so easy to track. Perhaps, the industry may be able to
record which files are shared through statistical sampling."
More practically, record labels need to provide
added consumer convenience to curb copyright infringe-
ment. For instance, a licensed download or audio or video
stream would need to be easier to find, faster to acquire,
and give a better quality copy than a shared file or a hacked
download.36 The price, if low enough, would be worth the
savings in transaction costs of finding the file or download-
ing the hack and using it, particularly if the downloading
takes a long time. 17 Record label sites that charge per
song are completely useless as maintained when individuals
can file share elsewhere on the Internet and receive similar
service. It is a waste of resources for the music industry
to maintain these sites when they are virtually unused and
underutilized.
The music industry's efforts to wean consumers
from file-swapping--legal musician subscription services-
are struggling. One reason is that these sites often limit
where, when and how long music can be played. 38 More-
over, the majority of content from the major labels remains
offline, thus making it vulnerable to the online file-sharing
music mecca. The music industry must continue to offer
alternatives to file-sharing and expand content, so consum-
ers can decide which one will work-pirated or legitimate
music.
Record labels should work more diligently to pro-
vide a higher quality of service for consumers either on
the Internet through upgrading their sites or upgrading the
content of CDs. Record labels have the means of imple-
menting top-notch Internet web sites that may provide
interviews with talent as well as pictures, videos, recording
sessions, and a number of other creative ways to lure con-
sumers to these web sites.
Further, record labels should include "extras" in
the sale of CDs. For instance, providing consumers with
exclusive access to online giveaways;
rebates on concert tickets; fan club
merchandise; attractive packaging; and
autographed inserts. CDs can offer a
host of value-added features, ranging
from bonus tracks to CD extras and
special web-based content that can
only be accessed by purchasing the
CD-acting as an inventive to spur
music sales.39 There is no limit to the
auxiliary goods that can be offered.
Another way to protect content is
to forge agreements with hardware and software industry
leaders, such as Cisco Systems, Intel Corp. and Microsoft,
to build copy protections into their network and consumer
products. For instance, some programs that come with
computers, like Microsoft Media Player, can disable illegal
songs and videos on a user's computer 40 Further, hard-
ware manufacturers can also utilize DRM-wrapped digital
files and streams or use Data-Play, DVD-Audio and SACD.
Disabling copyright infringement through hardware is more
workable because once the delivery system of songs is
reduced to a "stream," any attempt to control the media
becomes pointless.4
Another initiative that cuts to the heart of copy-
right infringement is the Recording Industry Association
of America's (RIAA) initiative to combat piracy on the
streets. The RIAA is working with the New York Police
Department to utilize anti-nuisance laws to pursue music
piracy activities. This effort includes placing investigators
on the street to pursue infringers, and partnering with law
enforcement to deploy anti-piracy rapid response teams.
Already, the RIAA has helped New York City law enforce-
ment bring 45 cases as part of the "Padlock Initiative"
42 With the addition of P2P file sharing to the sale of
pirated CDs this adds significant financial losses to copy-
right owners.
P2P file-sharing programs have great promise out-
side the domain of digital music. P2P programs will become
one of the most innovative technologies to date. However,
P2P programs have proved damaging to the music industry
because they undercut sales of CDs. But, P2P programs
have legitimacy in the online world, and courts will be reluc-
tant to find otherwise. In that spirit, the music industry must
change its strategy and focus on initiatives combating piracy
that will likely reap the most rewards for itself and the
artists it represents, like compulsory licensing and royalty
collection through the sales of certain computer and hard-
ware. If the music industry can thrive after the innovation
of the piano roll, then it can survive the digital revolution.
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